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CORPORATE PREDATORS ATTACK ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS: IT'S TIME TO ARBITRATE CLAIMS FILED UNDER
NAFTA's CHAPTER 11
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 is an
economic agreement between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico designed to increase regional trade and economic
competitiveness in the world economy.2 Given Mexico's seventy-
year history of expropriating foreign assets,3 ensuring adequate
investor protection was crucial to NAFTA's success. Accordingly,
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the investor-to-state dispute resolution
provision, provides that no Party signatory may nationalize or
expropriate an investor's assets except for a public purpose and
upon payment of adequate compensation.
4
1. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and
the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). NAFTA created a market
of 370 million people and $6.5 trillion in production. See Jonathan I. Miller, Comment,
Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute Resolution of Private Commercial Disputes Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (1994).
3. See generally Gloria L. Sandrino, The Nafta Investment Chapter and Foreign
Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259
(1994) (discussing Mexico's seventy-year history of expropriating foreign assets); see also
infra Part II (discussing the same).
4. According to NAFTA Article 1110:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and [international law]; and
(d) on payment of compensation ....
NAFTA art. 1110(1), supra note 1, at 641-642. The concept of expropriation is described
using words such as "'dispossession,' 'taking,' 'deprivation,' or 'privation."' J. Martin
Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 473 n.17 (1999) (quoting RUDOLF DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 98 (1995)). Regulatory
takings are referred to as "'indirect expropriation,' 'disguised expropriation,' or 'creeping
expropriation."' Id. at 517 & n.236 (quoting M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL
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Recently, several corporations have used Chapter 11 to
challenge legitimate domestic laws, regulations, and policies,
including environmental regulations.5  Critics contend that
Chapter 11 is "not so much about trade as about creating powerful
new rights for corporations and investors at the expense of the
public interest and democratic governance." 6  Moreover, these
critics claim that early Chapter 11 claims illustrate "how global
corporate predators, whether U.S., Canadian or Mexican, can use
NAFTA as a giant loophole to evade the rule of law and our
system of jurisprudence." 7  This assessment leads some to
conclude that Chapter 11 is "the latest, and one of the strongest,
reasons for the U[nited] S[tates] to withdraw from NAFTA.
' 8
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 282 (1994)). The term "investment" includes an
"'enterprise;' securities, loans to, or interest in the assets or profits of an enterprise;
tangible or intangible real estate or other property acquired for economic benefit; and
interests from the commitment of capital or other resources to economic activities." Id. at
474 n.25.
5. See infra Part VI (discussing two of the more controversial environmental claims).
6. Statement by Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch,
NAFTA "Investor-to-State" Provision Creates Giant Loophole for Companies to Evade
Justice (Nov. 24,1998) <http://www.citizen.org/Press/pr-gtw7.htm>.
7. Public Citizen, NAFTA's Birthday Bombshell, Corporate Predator Found Liable
for Malicious and Fraudulent Business Practices in Mississippi Uses NAFTA to Attack
Legal System (Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.citizen.org/Press/pr-gtw5.htm> (quoting Public
Citizen President Joan Claybrook).
8. Statement of Public Citizen President Joan Claybrook, NAFTA Challenge to
Mississippi Jury Verdict Threatens U.S. Justice System (Nov. 24, 1998)
<http://www.citizen.org/Press/pr-gtw6.htm>.
Chapter 11 has created significant anxiety globally. Until recently, Chapter 11
served as the model for the worldwide expansion of investment protection in the now-
defunct Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). See Wagner, supra note 4, at 467
(referring to the MAI, Negotiating Text (as of Apr. 24, 1998), available at Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, The MAI Negotiating Text (visited Sept. 3, 2000)
<http://www.oecd.orgl/daf/investment/fdi/mai/maitext.pdf>). The Secretary of the MAI
Negotiating Group noted that one Chapter 11 claim in particular, the Ethyl-Canada
dispute, see Part VI, infra, "caused MAI negotiators to 'think twice before copying the
expropriation provisions of the NAFTA."' Wagner, supra note 4, at 483 n.73. Also, a
group of thirty Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) released a statement calling for
national governments to "[e]liminate the investor state dispute resolution mechanism...
[and the] [] expropriation provision so that investors are not guaranteed an absolute right
to compensation for expropriation." Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute
Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 128-129 n.73 (1999). "In October 1998, as a result of 'significant
concerns' regarding the [MAI], including 'issues of sovereignty, protection of labour rights
and environment, culture and other important matters,' the OECD indefinitely suspended
further negotiations on the agreement." Wagner, supra note 4, at 481.
2000] It's Time to Arbitrate NAFTA's Chapter 11 Claims 535
This Comment concludes otherwise. Foreign corporations
have successfully used Chapter 11 to extort compensation
payments only because Party governments have settled Chapter
11 claims, rather than arbitrate them. Part II of this Comment
begins with a discussion of the history of foreign direct investment
in Mexico, which demonstrates the need for adequate investor
protection. Part III introduces Chapter l's predecessor, the U.S.
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program, which is the primary
vehicle the United States employs to protect investments globally.
Part IV provides an overview of Chapter 11 basics. Part V
discusses international law as applied to governmental regulations,
and through an examination of relevant authorities, concludes that
contrary to critics' claims, Chapter 11 does not require that Party
governments pay compensation to foreign corporations for the
negative economic impact of environmental regulations. Part VI
illustrates the Chapter 11 controversy by reviewing two of the
more controversial claims. Part VII evaluates a few of the most
common "solutions" legal scholars advance. Finally, Part VIII
concludes that remedial measures are not necessary-instead of
settling Chapter 11 claims, it's time to arbitrate them.
II. THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO
U.S. and Canadian negotiators incorporated Chapter 11 into
NAFTA to prevent Mexico from expropriating new foreign
investment. 9 "The problems with Mexico ...made the dispute
resolution provision an important negotiation goal for the United
States." 10 These problems began in the early 1900s, when the
Mexican Government encouraged foreign investment to facilitate
development of the Mexican economy.11 In addition to creating
an infusion of new capital and generating greater tax revenue,
government officials believed that substantial foreign investment
would allow Mexico to obtain and adopt new technology. 12 As a
result of Mexico's investor-friendly policy, foreign investment
9. See NAFTA: The Sting in Trade's Tail, ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 70, 71; see
also generally Sandrino, supra note 3 (describing Mexico's history of expropriating foreign
assets from the early 1900s to its adoption of NAFTA).
10. Kristin L. Oelstrom, Note, A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms of the NAFTA, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783, 801 (1994).
11. See Sandrino, supra note 3, at 298.
12. See id.
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poured into railroad construction, mining, public utilities, real
estate, banking, manufacturing, and commerce.13
Within a decade, the Mexican economy thrived, but foreign
nationals owned more than half the country's total wealth.14 At
the time, Mexican social theorists and policy-makers blamed
foreigners for Mexico's extreme economic dependence and its
political and economic underdevelopment. 15 These anti-foreign
sentiments fueled the Mexican Revolution of 1910.16 In 1917, the
Revolutionaries adopted a new Constitution that placed severe
restraints on foreign investment and foreign land ownership. 17
Additionally, the Mexican Government implemented policies
designed to harass foreign investors and began deliberately
expropriating and nationalizing foreign-owned assets. 18
The most dramatic and often-cited example of these polices is
Mexico's nationalization of the entire U.S. and British-owned oil
industry in 1938, which, at the time, was the second largest oil
industry in the world.19 Rather than declare war against Mexico,
13. See id. at 280.
14. See id. at 281.
15. See id. at 271-272.
16. See id. at 281.
17. See id. (referring to MEX. CONST. (1917), translated in XII CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 11 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1988)).
Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution provides:
Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national
territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to
transfer title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property.
Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use
and subject to payment of indemnity.
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property
such limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to
regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of
appropriation, in order to conserve them to ensure a more equitable distribution
of public wealth, to attain a well-balanced development of the country and
improvement of the living conditions of the rural and urban population.
MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 27, translated in XII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD, supra, at 23. The Article 27 provision is a codification of the "Calvo
Doctrine." See Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for
Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the
NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1147, 1150, 1163-1165 (1994). For a discussion of the Calvo
Doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
18. See Sandrino, supra note 3, at 283-300.
19. See id. at 287. The expropriation began when Mexican workers, frustrated with
low wages and poor working conditions, went on strike in 1937. See id. at 290 n.129. An
industrial arbitration board heard the dispute, decided the workers' grievances were
legitimate, and awarded them a one-third increase in wages. See id. The oil companies
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the U.S. and British Governments asserted that traditional
principles of international law required that Mexico pay the
investors prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 20 The
Mexican Government refused to pay, claiming that expropriation
was within Mexico's rights as a sovereign nation.21 The Mexican
Government justified its actions (legally) by asserting the Calvo
Doctrine, pursuant to which a government may nationalize or
expropriate any foreign investment according to domestic law and
policy (which may not require compensation), rather than
international norms (which require prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation). 22 The Calvo Doctrine further stipulates
that no foreign state may intervene, diplomatically or otherwise, to
enforce its citizens' claims.
23
More troublesome than Mexico's domestic policy was its
leadership and advocacy in the United Nations. In 1974,
developing states, having acquired a majority in the General
Assembly, enacted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (CERDS) 24 -Article 2 of which is considered "a classic
restatement of the Calvo Doctrine." 25  Under Article 2, if a
dispute arises over any foreign investment matter, the dispute
shall be decided according to national/domestic judicial or
arbitral procedures. 26 Industrialized states staunchly opposed this
appealed the decision to the Mexican Supreme Court, which upheld the decision. See id.
Defiantly, the companies refused to obey the Court. See id. In response, Mexican
President Lazaro Cirdenas promptly signed a decree nationalizing the companies' assets.
See id.
20. See id. at 290-291.
21. See id. at 291. According to the Mexican Government:
(a) nationalization was a legitimate exercise of its sovereign right to restructure
its economy; [and] (b) the compensation demanded by the United States would
constitute an inadmissible fetter on this right: '[T]he future of the nation could
not be halted by the impossibility of immediately paying the value of the
property belonging to a small number of foreigners who only seek a lucrative
end;'....
Id.
22. See id. at 268.
23. See id.
24. CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 L.L.M.
251 (1975).
25. Sandrino, supra note 3, at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See id. at 275.
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position, arguing that the correct approach for settling foreign
investment disputes involves international arbitration or
adjudication and requires payment of "prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation."
27
In the aftermath of the CERDS, gross foreign direct
investment in the Third World declined drastically from $13
billion in 1981 to $9.5 billion in 1986.28 The decline was due, in
part, to the perception that legal standards for protecting foreign
investment in Third World states were inadequate.29
III. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITS)
The United States launched the BIT program in 1977.30 The
program's goal was to circumvent the CERDS by creating a
network of treaties with other sovereign nations to embrace the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" standard of compensation.31
The United States was hugely successful in this endeavor-as of
March 1998, there were 1300 BITs. 32
The primary purpose of a BIT is to protect against
expropriation. 33  U.S. BITs provide protection against
expropriation "in accordance with international law." 34 Similarly,
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA provides: "[e]ach Party shall accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security." 35 Because NAFTA is an agreement
between three countries, it is essentially a multilateral BIT
governing investor protection.
27. Id. at 275 n.47.
28. See id. at 277.
29. See id.
30. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The
Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621 (1993) (describing the evolution of the BIT
program from 1977 to the present).
31. See id. at 625.
32. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 472.
33. See Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 625.
34. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FACT SHEET, U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY PROGRAM (May 5, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/ifd bitprogram.html>.
35. NAFTA art. 1105(1), supra note 1, at 639.
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IV. CHAPTER 11 BASICS
Chapter 11 of NAFTA protects investors from
uncompensated government expropriation. In sum, it provides
that: (1) private investors have standing to force a foreign
government to engage in international arbitration under the rules
of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);36 (2) an investor may
bring a Chapter 11 claim directly before an international arbitral
tribunal thereby bypassing the domestic courts of the host
government; 37 (3) all proceedings are confidential;38 (4) each party
chooses an arbitrator and the presiding arbitrator is chosen by
mutual agreement (a majority of the votes of the arbitrators
decides the dispute); 39 (5) the applicable law is the language of
NAFTA, interpreted and applied in accordance with international
law;40 and (6) the final decision is binding on the parties.
41
There are several advantages to arbitration under Chapter
11. First, international arbitration reduces the traditional costs
associated with litigating in domestic courts. 42 Second, it lessens
the risk that the jury may be technically incompetent and the
judge may be sympathetic to the host country's government.
43
Third, each party appoints its own arbitrators to present its
position in a neutral arbitral forum.44 Finally, international law,
rather than potentially-biased domestic law, applies to the
dispute.
45
The NAFTA investor-to-state mechanism differs slightly
from dispute resolution systems in prior international agreements
in that Chapter 11 allows individuals to sue national
governments. 46 The negotiators involved in drafting the investor-
36. See id. art. 1120(1), at 643.
37. See id. art. 1121, at 643-644.
38. See id. annex 1137.4, at 648.
39. See id. art. 1123, at 644.
40. See id. art. 1131(1), at 645.
41. See id. art. 1136(1), at 646.
42. See Ganguly, supra note 8, at 122.
43. See id. at 122-123.
44. See id. at 123.
45. See id. at 122-123.
46. See Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, Briefing Paper, Ethyl Corporation v.s.
Government of Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental
Safeguards (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
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to-state mechanism opted to grant private standing so as to furnish
investors with the greatest latitude to protect their interests.47 The
attorney for one Chapter 11 claims brought against Canada noted
that Chapter 11 proceedings are held in secret to illicit greater
cooperation and facilitate production of sensitive documents that
would never be willingly disclosed in open court.48
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW: REGULATIONS AND EXPROPRIATION 4
9
While Chapter 11 provides protection against direct and
indirect expropriation, it does not define either term. Instead, it
requires all claims be decided in accordance with international
law. 50 International law defines "expropriation" as "a compulsory
transfer of property rights." 51 "Indirect expropriation" is defined
as a measure "'having effect equivalent to ... expropriation,' 'any
direct or indirect measure' of expropriation, 'any other measure
having the same nature or the same effect against investments,' or
'all other measures whose effect is to dispossess, directly or
indirectly, the investors."' 52
Although some regulations may have the effect of "indirect
expropriation," traditional principles of international law and
Chapter 11 specifically exclude environmental regulations from
the host of governmental activity that can trigger liability. The
first step in reaching this conclusion is to analyze NAFTA itself.
Treaties "evidence an acceptance of a principle of international
law by the parties to the treaty"53 and, when available, are the
primary source of international law.54 NAFTA includes several
provisions specifically designed to protect the environment.55
Article 1114 states that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
<http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases[Ethylbri.htm>.
47. See Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 626.
48. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 476 n.38.
49. For an in-depth examination of NAFTA's Chapter 11 see id. at 474-481; indirect
expropriation under domestic and international law see id. at 502-537; and NAFrA's
specific provisions regarding the environment see id. at 478-480.
50. See NAFTA art. 1105(1), supra note 1, at 639.
51. Amoco Int'l Fin. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 189 (1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1320, 1342-1343 (1998).
52. Wagner, supra note 4, at 473.
53. SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 73.
54. See id.
55. See NAFTA art. 1114, supra note 1, at 642.
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enforcing any measure ... [that ensures] that investment activity
in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns." 56  Further, NAFTA's Preamble
provides that the Parties intend to "promote sustainable
development," to "strengthen the development and enforcement
of environmental laws and regulations," and to implement
NAFTA's goals in a manner "consistent with environmental
protection and conservation."
57
In addition to NAFTA, the Parties adopted the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC),58 also known as the "'environmental side agreement'
to NAFTA. ' 59 The NAAEC's purpose was to "foster the
protection and improvement of the environment ... for the well-
being of present and future generations." 60 According to the
Parties, the NAAEC's objective was to "enhance compliance with,
and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations."
61
Custom is another generally accepted source of international
law. 62 In this context, it is significant that the constitutions of
nineteen nations make clear that governmental measures affecting
the value of property will not be considered compensable
takings.
63
Judicial decisions, both domestic and international, are also
commonly consulted in interpreting international agreements.
64
"[T]he general lack of more authoritative sources addressing the
limits of indirect expropriation gives [judicial] decisions a special
legitimacy." 65 In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution protects private property by guaranteeing that
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
56. Id.
57. NAFTA pmbl., supra note 1, at 289, 297.
58. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 9, 12, 14,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
59. Wagner, supra note 4, at 479.
60. Id. at 480 (quoting NAAEC art. 1, supra note 58, at 1483).
61. NAAEC art. 1, supra note 58, at 1483.
62. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 74.
63. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 518 n.241 (citing the constitutions of Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Jamaica,
Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Papa New Guinea, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
64. See generally id. at 518-519.
65. Id. at 519.
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compensation." 66 Until 1922, however, the U.S. Government was
not required to pay compensation unless the "government took
full title to private property."67  The U.S. Supreme Court
discarded this standard in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
68
establishing that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,"
and thus require compensation.
69
Three factors are particularly significant in determining
whether the government has, in fact, gone "too far." 70 The first
factor is "the nature of the governmental action." 71  If the
government "physically invade[s] or permanently
appropriate[s] '72 the property, compensation is automatically
required.73 Lesser interference, including regulation, however,
normally does not require compensation.
74
Second, the Supreme Court considers "the severity of the
[governmental action's] economic impact. ' 75  A regulation
generally constitutes a compensable taking if it "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use" of the property.
76
"[M]ere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is
insufficient to demonstrate a taking."77
The final factor the Supreme Court considers in determining
whether a regulation affects a compensable taking is the degree to
which the regulation interferes with the claimant's "reasonable
investment-backed expectations." 78  Thus, when property is
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 500 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
68. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
69. Id. at 415.
70. Wagner, supra note 4, at 503.
71. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 643.
72. Id.; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
73. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
74. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993). See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 ("[G]overnment
may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without
incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with
respect to the full scope of the State's police power.").
75. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645.
76. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-1019.
77. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (citing Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (involving approximately 75% diminution in value)); see also Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss
will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full.").
78. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645.
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already subject to extensive regulation, the owner has no
reasonable expectation that new or changed regulations will not
affect the property's value.
79
In Canada, a plaintiff cannot recover the value of
expropriated assets unless the regulation transfers a benefit from
the original owner to the government. 80 The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, section 7, guarantees that "everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of the person... ,"81 but does not
guarantee "the right to 'property."' 82  Compensation is not
required even when a Canadian regulation prohibits any and all
use of the property.
83
79. See id. Applying this reasoning, courts reject compensation claims arising out of a
vast array of laws protecting the environment and human health, including among others,
laws requiring the cleanup of harmful chemical byproducts; see, e.g., Atlas Corp. v. United
States, 895 F.2d 745, 756-758 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that a law requiring uranium
producers to clean up hazardous wastes did not require compensation even though the
cleanup costs would exceed the property value and the government encouraged the
companies to produce the uranium); restricting the sale and transport of endangered
species; see, e.g., United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976); and prohibiting the
exploitation of natural resources on private property for reasons of public health, safety,
and welfare; see, e.g., MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 547-549 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that the denial of a timber harvest permit does not deny all economically
viable use of property).
80. See Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's
Ecological Footprints, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 208, 209 (1998) ("[A]n aggrieved
landowner must be able to demonstrate that not only has property been taken, but that the
taking has also benefited the expropriating authority.").
81. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
82. Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for
Sovereignty?, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281, 282 (1998).
83. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 512 (discussing Hartel Holdings Co. v. Council of
Calgary [1984] 8 D.L.R. 4th 321, 334 (Can.) (refusing to require compensation because the
government's actions were "taken pursuant to a legitimate and valid planning purpose,...
[therefore] the resulting detriment to the appellant [land owner] is one that must be
endured in the public interest."); Soo Mill & Lumber Co. v. Corporation of Sault Ste-Marie
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 78, 83 (Can.) (upholding a zoning regulation that "sterilized [the claimant's
land] in respect of any effective use," because development freezes are not prohibited if
enacted according to municipal plans or zoning regulations); Sanbay Devs. Ltd. v. City of
London [1975] 45 D.L.R. 3d 403, 409 (Can.) (holding valid a zoning regulation that halted
development of claimant's land)). Author Swenarchuk notes that:
Canadian by-laws, regulations, or other planning instruments do not generally
involve a taking or transfer of the full use, title, or benefit of property.
Therefore, if a landowner's ability to use or develop his or her property is
constrained by a properly enacted zoning by-law, the landowner is not entitled to
compensation, even if the zoning by-law causes a diminution in property value.
Swenarchuk, supra note 80, at 208-209.
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Private property is protected, to various degrees, in both the
United States and Canada without reference to the property
owner's national origin. Property rights in Mexico, conversely, are
conditioned upon foreign property owners agreeing to "consider
themselves as nationals in respect to such property and bind
themselves not to involve the protection of their governments in
matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of noncompliance,
of forfeiture of the acquired property to the Nation."
84
The most definitive statement regarding whether the
economic impact of environmental regulations requires
compensation comes from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
The Tribunal, which is one of the most important interpreters of
international law,85 has promulgated an impressive body of case
law that influences the shaping of international law principles.
86
According to the Tribunal, a state is not liable for economic injury
that is a consequence of "bona fide regulation within the accepted
police power of states."
87
Taken together, generally accepted principles of international
law and NAFTA's specific provisions make clear that Chapter 11
does not require that states compensate foreign nationals for the
economic impact of environmental regulations.
VI. THE CLAIMS
88
While several claims were recently filed under Chapter 11;
two environmental claims, in particular, have received extensive
review. The first is Metalclad's claim against Mexico. In 1995, the
Mexican Government authorized Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, to
take over and operate a toxic waste facility in the small Mexican
84. MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 27.1, translated in XII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 17, at 25.
85. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 519.
86. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 80.
87. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985).
A state is not required to pay compensation for the loss of property resulting from "bona
fide taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action that is commonly accepted as
within the police power of states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 cmt. g (1987); see also Wagner, supra note 4, at 518
n.240 (quoting SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 282-283 ("'[A]Il measures affecting
property rights' would not be an acceptable definition of a taking in international law 'for
the simple reason that normal activities of states, such as taxation, affect property rights
and cannot be expected to give rise to international concern.")).
88. For more information regarding the Chapter 11 claims filed thus far, see Wagner,
supra note 4, at 487-500.
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town of San Luis Potosi.89 In late 1996, after Metalclad invested
$20 million, the Governor of San Luis Potosi informed the
company that the facility was an environmental hazard and would
be shut down.90 Although Metalclad was aware that the Mexican
hazardous waste industry was highly regulated, on January 2,
1997, the company filed a Chapter 11 claim against the Mexican
Government. 91 The complaint alleged that "having been denied
the right to operate its constructed and permitted facility,
[Metalclad's] property ha[d] therefore been, as a practical matter,
expropriated. 92  The Governor's decision to halt the facility's
operation was supported by a geological audit performed by
environmental impact analysts at the University of San Luis
Potosi, who found that the facility was located on an underground
alluvial stream and could therefore contaminate the local water
supply.
93
The most controversial claim, however, was brought by Ethyl
Corporation against Canada. In April 1997, Canada enacted a law
banning Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT),
a gasoline additive designed to prevent engine knocking.94 The
Canadian Government enacted the ban in response to a Canadian
Environmental Health Directorate report, which claimed that
89. See id. at 488.
90. See id. Metalclad was aware that its "proposed business in Mexico [wals highly
regulated and [wals subject to Mexican Environmental law." Metalclad SEC Filing, Form
10-KT, Apr. 1, 1997, Item 1(a), available at
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/13547/0000013547-97-00O008.txt> [hereinafter
Metalclad Apr. 1, 1997 SEC Filing]. Mexican environmental law regulates both the
construction and operation of hazardous waste facilities and requires that operators
conduct environmental impact studies and obtain permits from the National Institute of
Ecology (INE) as well as from local and state agencies. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 488-
489. Operation of such facilities and compliance with INE regulations is subject to
continued monitoring by the Federal Attorney for the Protection of the Environment. See
id. at 489.
91. See Metalclad SEC Filing, Form 10-Q, Nov. 20, 1998, pt. II, Item 1, available at
<http://www.sec.gov/Achives/edgar/data/13547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> [hereinafter
Metalclad Nov. 20, 1998 SEC Filing]. For a discussion of the significance of Metalclad's
knowledge of the fact that the Mexican hazardous waste industry was highly regulated, see
infra Part VIII.
92. Metalclad Apr. 1, 1997 SEC Filing Item l(e), supra note 90. Metalclad claimed
that the "expropriation" entitled the company to the fair market value of the facility in
damages. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, ch. 11, 1997 S.C. 1 (Can.).
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MMT exposure causes serious neurological problems similar to
mild Parkinson's Disease.
95
In response, on April 14, 1997, Ethyl, a U.S. corporation, filed
a $250 million Chapter 11 claim against the Canadian Government
on behalf of Ethyl's wholly-owned subsidiary, Ethyl Canada, the
sole Canadian importer, processor, and distributor of MMT.
96
Ethyl alleged that the Canadian law constituted an expropriation
of Ethyl's business in Canada and therefore required
compensation under NAFTA's Article 1110.97 Ethyl sought to
recover its loss of sales and profits in Canada, loss of value of
Ethyl Canada, loss of worldwide sales, the cost of reducing
operations in Canada, expenses incurred in defending itself
against Canada's allegations, lobbying to defeat the law, and loss
of its goodwill both inside and outside Canada.98 Ethyl also
claimed that the legislative debate itself constituted an
expropriation of its assets because public criticism of MMT
damaged the company's reputation.
99
In July 1998, the Canadian Government settled the Ethyl
dispute. 100 Ethyl's tactics cost Canada $19 million and forced the
legislature to repeal the ban on MMT. 10 1
VII. SOLUTIONS
Although international law, NAIFTA, and the NAAEC do
not support challenges to environmental regulations, Chapter 11
claims can have a substantial chilling effect on governments'
willingness to enact or enforce them.10 2 If governments choose to
defend such regulations, they risk having to pay huge
compensation payments if the defense is unsuccessful.10 3 Critics
95. See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIRECTORATE, HEALTH CANADA, RISK
ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMBUSTION PRODUCTS OF METHYLCYCLOPENTADIENYL
MANGANESE TRICARBONYL (MMT) IN GASOLINE (Dec. 6, 1994) (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
96. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 492.
97. See id. at 491-492.
98. See id. at 492.
99. See Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 46.
100. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 495.
101. See Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT
Fuel Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 55 (1999) (referring to Order
Amending the Schedule to the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, Sor/98-393, 132 C.
Gaz. 2265 (pt. 111998) (Can.)).
102. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 467.
103. See id. One commentator acknowledged this potentially detrimental effect by
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claim that this effect poses a serious threat to environmental
regulations and national sovereignty. 10 4 After much debate, legal
scholars have advanced a spectrum of remedial measures. A few
of the most popular solutions are introduced and critiqued below.
A. Adopt Interpretive Provisions
To be sure that mere changes to laws, regulations, or policies
that directly or indirectly affect the value of an asset are not
sufficient to invoke Chapter 11, one commentator suggests that a
series of interpretive provisions be drafted into NAFTA. 10 5 For
example, the draft of a similar provision in the MAI includes an
interpretive note providing that each country retains the right to
adopt or modify its environmental regulations and specifying that
"the provision does not require compensation for investment
losses due to regulation . .. and other normal [governmental]
activity in the public interest.
10 6
stating that:
This challenge to the sovereign powers of governments does not necessarily
entail the direct taking away of the power to legislate in the interests of the
populace. Indeed, it is the possibility of having to pay reparations for
expropriation of the business of the private actor, as defined in these various
treaties, which may serve as an even more effective indirect attack. The
prospect of crushing liability claims or the chilling effect of the number and size
of claims that may result under [investor-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms]
can deter governments from legislating in the interest of the public.
Ganguly, supra note 8, at 119 (citations omitted). Ganguly discusses a host of new
considerations that must be taken into account in the following example:
[I]f the government of a nation wants to implement legislation banning the
advertising of hard alcohol on television, there are several prudential
considerations that must be taken into account with the advent of the [investor-
to-state dispute mechanism]. First, how many foreign investors can claim that
the ban on advertising will result in a loss of sales and profits and hence will
constitute a taking by the government? Second, how large will those claims be?
Third, how likely is it that the arbitral panels will rule in favor of the investors?
And finally, in the worst-case scenario where all claims are brought and the
government loses all arbitrations, can the government afford to take that loss
given the benefit to its people?
Id.
104. See generally, e.g., Wagner, supra note 4 (discussing critics' claims that Chapter 11
poses a real threat to environmental regulations and national sovereignty); Lawrence L.
Herman, Settlement of International Trade Disputes-Challenges to Sovereignty-A
Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121 (1998) (discussing the same).
105. See Herman, supra note 104, at 136. Canada favors utilizing this approach to
clarify and limit NAFFA's investor-to-state provision. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 469.
106. Wagner, supra note 4, at 486 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, organizations such as Greenpeace International strongly oppose
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Based on established international law principles and
NAFTA's language, an interpretive note is not necessary to clarify
Chapter 11's intended scope. Of the proposed solutions, however,
it is the most appealing because it could be adopted quickly and
would establish that, at least as between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, environmental regulations do not trigger
Chapter 11 liability. An interpretive note, however, would not
have the same effect as a published decision, which would
establish globally applicable precedent.
B. Abandon the Investor-to -State Provision
Another solution may be to abandon the notion of investor-
to-state dispute settlement all together and return to the more
traditional means of dispute settlement where investment disputes
are arbitrated between governments only.107 "When governments
are the only entities with legal standing to bring a case challenging
a regulation or other law under an international agreement,
political and diplomatic pressures reduce the likelihood that
frivolous lawsuits will be initiated. ' 10 8 Abandoning the investor-
to-state provision, however, would not only sacrifice the cost
savings associated therewith, but would also discourage
cooperation between the parties and complicate discovery.
Moreover, if the investor-to-state provision is discarded,
individual investors' rights will be subject to political maneuvering,
which may sacrifice many legitimate claims.
C. Establish a North American Trade Tribunal
Alternatively, NAFTA might be re-written to provide that a
supra-national court, similar to the highly successful European
Court of Justice, shall adjudicate all investment disputes. In
January 1992, the Joint Working Group of the American Bar
Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and the Barra
Mexicana (Group) produced an extensive report on NAFTA's
dispute resolution provisions. 10 9 Significantly, the Group viewed
the MAI because they continue to believe it will limit state sovereignty in dealing with a
wide range of environmental and human health and safety measures. See Herman, supra
note 104, at 135.
107. See Herman, supra note 104, at 136.
108. Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 46.
109. See Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement et al., The Joint
Working Group of the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and the
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Chapter l's features positively. Its members believed, however,
that NAFTA would be improved were there a "North American
Trade Tribunal" to adjudicate disputes.110 Establishing such a
tribunal, however, means abolishing the arbitral model and the
benefits that flow therefrom.
Given NAFTA's stance on environmental protection, the
overwhelming weight of authority suggesting that environmental
regulations do not give rise to compensation claims, and the
importance of establishing precedent in this area, Chapter 11
should be tested. Corrective measures need not be implemented
now, nor must the Parties choose which solution is best, until the
NAFTA arbitral tribunal decides a claim, or several claims.
VIII. CONCLUSION: IT'S TIME TO ARBITRATE
Governments settle Chapter 11 claims for several reasons.
First, while other international tribunals have decided that
international law does not require compensation for the economic
impact of legitimate regulations, in deciding this pivotal issue, it is
conceivable that a tribunal convened to hear a Chapter 11 dispute
could go either way. Second, although the arbitrators empanelled
in the Chapter 11 process are expected to be independent and
impartial, they are trade specialists. By nominating an arbitrator
who shares the investor's nationality and political or economic
philosophies, the investor may obtain an advantage.111 Third,
Barra Mexicana Report on Dispute Settlement Procedures in the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 27 INT'LLAW. 831, 831 (1993).
110. See id. at 832.
111. See Ganguly, supra note 8, at 124. Ganguly further illustrates the potential
conflict and dilemma in the NAFrA empanelling process by noting that:
Actual practice indicates pressure to advocate for the nominating party ....
One would assume that since both the host country government and the investor
get to appoint one arbitrator, those two arbitrators would cancel each other out
because of the offsetting biases and create an effectively neutral tribunal with
the neutral chairman in charge. However, in the case of [Chapter 11], the
judgment of the panel can only be made by a majority of the panel. 'The need to
obtain a majority often leads to a process of negotiation and compromise, in
which the neutral feels obliged to trim or adjust his position in the search for a
coalition with one of his colleagues-and ultimately perhaps to concur,
reluctantly, in an award different from the one he might have preferred.' The
danger in this process can affect either the investor or the host country
government depending upon the discreet advocacy abilities of their respective
appointees. But as the possible appointees are usually knowledgeable about
trade and investment issues and not well versed in issue of public health
concerns, there is a greater chance that the investor will appoint an arbitrator
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
because any investor can bring a claim and there is no cap on
damages, the financial risks are staggering.
Even so, Chapter 11 is not a giant loophole. If NAFTA's
signatories refused to settle these claims, a NAFTA tribunal
would most likely uphold environmental regulations. An
examination of Metalclad's claim, for example, exposes the fact
that the company had no "investment-backed expectations" that
its facility was regulation-proof. Metalclad was operating a
hazardous waste facility in Mexico. It knew that its activities were
subject to regulation and/or governmental abatement and made
investments subject to that knowledge. As discussed above,
international legal tribunals frequently refer to the factors the U.S.
Supreme Court identified to decide whether indirect
expropriation claims require compensation. 112 In Concrete Pipe,
the Court held that the owner of property already subject to
extensive regulation has no reasonable expectation that new or
changed regulations will not affect the property's value.
113
Moreover, it is customary for international tribunals to reject
expropriation claims where the governmental action seems
"reasonable." 114 "If the reasons given are valid and bear some
plausible relationship to the action taken, no attempt may be
made to search deeper to see whether the State was activated by
some illicit motive."'115 The fact that the Governor of San Luis
Potosi halted Metalclad's operations to protect the local water
supply seems reasonable beyond question. Therefore, if the
NAFFA tribunal decides the Metalclad claim in accordance with
U.S. takings jurisprudence, Metalclad will lose.
with a trade and investment background and only agree to a neutral chairman
with the same type of background. The government, in trying to appoint public
health-oriented arbitrators, will be faced with the relative dearth of available
choices and may have to concede the choice of background of the neutral
arbitrator to the investor. Such a result would further prejudice the arbitral
process against the government's case to protect its public heath regulations.
Id. at 124-125 (internal citation omitted).
112. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 520.
113. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
114. Id.
115. G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?,
1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 338.
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In sum, Chapter 11 provides protection against most forms of
governmental expropriation, but the negative economic impact of
environmental regulations does not trigger liability. International
law, NAFTA, and the NAAEC provide support to assert that
modifying Chapter 11 is not required-instead of settling these
claims, it's time to arbitrate them.
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